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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ELBERT B. RUMSEY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent_, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, a Municipal 
Corporation of the State of Utah, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
10181 
PETITION FOR REHEARING AND 
SUPPORTING BRIEF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The defendant and appellant respectfully move 
this court for a rehearing of the case at bar for the 
following reasons: 
I. It is the considered judgment and opinion of the 
appellant that it is erroneous as a matter of law for 
the court to affirm a proposition that any officer of 
the appellant in this state can waive governmental im-
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munity of the said appellant's liability for. tort; that 
the province of waiving such liability is entirely with 
the State Legislature. That in the opinion of the writer 
the court has not thoroughly considered the proposition 
that previous decisions of cases rendered by this court 
may be determinative of the issue in a subsequent case 
when the capacity in which the appellant city was act-
ing, proprietary or governmental, was neither pleaded 
nor proved by the respondent in a jury trial and such 
affirmation is prejudicial to the lawful rights of the 
respondent and controverts the rule of stare decisis 
approved and sustained by this court. 
2. That the prevailing opinion and decision of this 
court is erroneous as a matter of law and legal civil 
procedure, in affirming that the respondent could law-
fully reopen a jury trial after the jury had made and 
entered its verdict and had by the court been discharged, 
when the said respondent had requested a jury trial 
covering all of the facts without exception. 
3. That the court was in error in holding that pre-
vious cases were determinative of issues in this case 
when the capacity in which the facility operated by 
the appellant city was neither pleaded nor proved while 
the court was in session sitting with a jury. The court 
appears to assume that the capacity of the appellant 
in operating the Wasatch Springs Plunge is proprie-
tary without pleading or proof, except in ~ontrovention 
of the rules of civil procedure in force and effect in this 
state. 
4 
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SUPPORTING BRIEF 
POINT I 
THE PREVAILING OPINION AND DE-
CISION OF THE COURT IS IN ERROR IN 
HOLDING THAT GOVERNMENTAL IMMU-
NITY OF ,.fHE DEFENDANT CAN BE 
WAIVED BY THE ASSISTANT CITY AT-
'' 
TORNEY. 
In the case of Hamilton v. Salt Lake City~ this court 
said with approval: 
"The California District Court of Appeals, 
Second District Court, had this to say in a case 
where injury had occurred upon a sidewalk and 
where a 'verified claim for damages shall be pre-
sented in writing and filed with the clerk . . . ' 
St. Cal. 1931, P. 2475 §I. It is generally accepted 
rule that a municipality and its officers are with-
out power to waive compliance with the law in 
such matters .... The statute does not authorize 
a waiver nor does it provide any substitute for a 
written verified claim. The authorities we have 
cited quite generally hold that actual knowledge 
on the part of officers of a municipality of the 
facts required to be stated in a claim does not 
dispense with the claim itself. In view of our 
holding that the city could not be bound by any 
alleged waiver, consisting as it would of an ex-
tension of time for fiiling the claim, it is unneces-
sary to point out the particulars in which the 
complaint failed to show any aiuthority on the 
part of defendants Curl and Macintyre to rep-
resent or act for the city except in the mere matter 
of the investigation of the plaintiffs injuries and 
the cause thereof." 
5 
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In the case of Cooper et al v. Butte County et al.J 
17 Cal. App. 2d 43, 61 P.2d 516, the California Court 
held that a provision of a statute requiring the filing 
of a verified claim by any person seeking recovery 
against the county for injuries sustained as a result 
of dangerous or defective condition of the public street 
or highway is not subject to wq.iver by the county) and 
the county could not be estopped to set up failure to 
comply with the statute as a defense in an action against 
the county for injuries, where the claim was not veri-
fied. Hamilton v. Salt Lake City) 106 P.2d 1028, at 
page 1032 of the Pacific Reporter, 99 Utah '362. (The 
decision was unanimous.) 
"Where a right is purely statutory and is granted 
upon conditions, one who seeks to enforce the right 
must by allegation and proof bring himself within the 
cond~tions." ld. page 1030 of th_e Pacific R~porter. 
So here, if the city cannot waive itS defense and 
a county cannot waive such, then it is absolutely im-
possible for an officer to do so. It follows that if the 
alleged discussion of governmental immunity, as held 
at the pretrial of the case at bar, which the attorney 
for the- city denies, such attorney could not waive the 
defense of governmental immunity. One ponders why 
the respondent's attorney. did not amend his complaint 
then. Later he stated in his affidavit that he was taken 
by surprise. 
In the recent case of Morrison v. Horne_, 363 P.2d 
1113, 12 U. 2nd 131, this court held: 
6 
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''As to estoppel: It would be unreasonable 
unrealistic to conclude that a clerk or a minis-
terial officer having no authority to do so, could 
bind the county to a variation of a zoning ordi-
nance duly passed, to which everyone ··has notice 
by its passage and publication, because a minis-
terial employee erred in characterizing the type 
of property. The authorities generally supp<:>rt 
such a conclusion, (1. A.L.R. 2nd 351 et seq.) 
and we are constrained· to and do hold that the· 
.assessor's erroneous description of the subject 
property as commercial does not preclude the 
zoning authorities from denying the permit for 
the service station.'' 
Section 1.01 Immunity. "In absence of con-
stitutional or. statutory provision, state generally 
immune from tort liability. W aivBr is a "legisla-
tive question in almost all states. A few have 
constitutional prohibitions against state being 
sued'." Same rule is applicable to state agencies. 
Personal Injury. Actions. Defenses. Damages. 
Vol. 6, page 144. 
"The rule is general that a municipal corpo-
ration is not liable for alleged tortious injuries 
to the persons or property of individuals, when 
engaged in the performance of public or gov-
ernmental functions or duties. So far as muni-
cipal corporations exercise powers conferred on 
them for purposes essentially public~ they stand 
as does the. sovereignty whose agents they are~ 
and are not liable to be sued for any act or omis-
sion occurring while in the exercise of such 
powers, unless by some statute the right of action 
be given." Gillmor v. Salt Lake City~ 32 U. 180, 
89 P. 714, where this court cited with approval 
the above quotation from American and English 
Encyclopedia of Law, page 1193. 
7 
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Grantee purchasers of a city deed executed by 
mayor to certain street property dedicated as a public 
alley, purchasers received no interest against the city, 
this court saying: 
"Balancing the justice of the cause, we find 
there is no ground for an estoppel ·in pais as 
against the city. In so doing we are mindful of 
the fact that individuals dealing, with officers 
should be able to rely upon their acts; that offi-
cers should act within th-e authority granted; 
and that officers should be held to their acts and 
covenants like individuals. However, the com-
munity is interested in vacating of streets and 
the legislature has provided that they may be 
vacated by ordinance, in order that the com-
munity may have notice of the acts of the com-
missions and thereby protect the private prop-
erty holder and the coxymunity against such 
actions." Tooele City v. Elkington_, 100 Wash. 
485, 116 P.2d 406. 
Mr. Justice Crockett, speaking for the court in an 
unanimous decision in the case of Mary Ramirez v. 
Ogden City_, held: 
"It has long been recognized in this jurisdic-
tion that a municipal corporation may act both 
in a public and private capacity and that when 
performing in a public or governmental function 
it is not subject to tort liability. From time to 
time certain judicial expressions have been ut-
tered questioning the soundness of that rule as 
a matter of policy. Whatever its desirability or 
undesirability may be, it has long been firmly 
established in our law by the ruling of the ma-
jority of this court. In deference to the prin-
8 
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ciple of stare decisis we do not feel at liberty to 
consider its merits or demerits. Any change 
would be properly within the province of· the 
legislature:'~ Ramirez v. Ogden City~ 279 P.2d 
463, at page 464, 3 U. 2d 102. See also Davis 
v. Provo City~ 1 U.2d 244,265 P.2d 415; Hus-
band v. Salt Lake City~ 92 U. 449, 69 P.2d 491. 
If then, only the legislature can lawfully make any 
change in a city's immunity from tort liability and this 
excludes the city commission and all courts, how can 
this court consistently say that an assistant city attorney 
can make a change by waiving the city's governmental 
immunity? 
True, the pretrial order had the following state-
ment, "The parties agree that the plaintiff at the time 
of his claimed injuries was a business invitee." Now 
even if one could infer that this established the capacity 
in which the city operated the Wasatch Springs Plunge, 
it was not pleaded and unless it was so pleaded by the 
plaintiff he could not raise in a jury trial such a propo-
sition after the trial and discharge of the jury. Wade 
v. Salt Lake City_, 10 U.2d 374, 353 P.2d 914. 
From this statement in the pretrial order it is pre-
posterous to believe that the city operated its swimming 
pool in a proprietary capacity. One may be a business 
invitee in applying for a city building permit or paying 
taxes, yet that does not change the capacity of the city 
in issuing the permit from acting in governmental to 
a private or propietary capacity, nor the county in col-
lection of taxes from acting in a governmental or 
9 
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public capacity to acting one of a private or proprietary 
capacity. Yet in each instance the building permit 
applicant and the taxpayer came to do business; they 
are ,business invitees. Moreover, the city attorney or 
his assistant could not waive governmental immunity 
as a defense of the city. 
POINT II. 
THE PREVAILING OPINION AND DE-
CISION OF THE COURT IS IN ERROR IN 
HOLDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF HAD A 
RIGHT TO REOPEN A JURY TRIAL AFTER 
THE VERDICT HAD BEEN MADE AND EN-
TERED AND THE JURY DISCHARGED. 
In this case the lower court permitted the plaintiff 
below to reopen a jury trial after the conclusion thereof 
and discharge of the jury. The appellant claims that 
there is no rule of civil procedure in force in this state 
to permit this. Yet the prevailing opinon and decision 
of this court holds this : 
"Respondent Rumsey's complaint alleged that 
the City operated VVasatch'Springs Plunge, and 
that he paid an admission fee for entrance. How-
ever, whether those allegations were sufficient 
to state a cause of action against the City or 
whether it is necessary to allege more facts as 
to the competitive nature of the operation so 
that it can be determined from the complaint 
rather than from evidence produced at trial 
whether the operation is governmental or pro-
10 
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prietary, need not be decided here. As shown 
above, a pre-trial conference was held in this 
case. In the pre-trial order it appears that the 
parties agreed that at the time of the accident, 
respondent was a business invitee. Such a fact 
could only be material in the event the Wasatch 
Springs Plunge was being operated in a pro-
prietary capacity. If the Plunge was operated 
in a governmental capacity the City would be 
immune from liability regardless of the status 
of the respondent. It would appear therefore 
that the issue of whether the plunge was operated 
in a governmental or proprietary capacity was 
a matter which was disposed ·of in the pre-trial 
conference and the issues for trial were therefore 
under 'Rule 16 U.R.C.P. limited to the remain-
ing issues of negligence and damages, unless 
modified at the trial to prevent manifest injus-
tice. We are more disposed to that conclusion 
in view o fthe failure of the City to contradict 
the affidavit of respondent's attorney filed in 
opposition to the City's motion for a judgment 
notwithst anding the verdict, that the issue of 
governmental or proprietary operation was dis-
cussed ~nd that the City admitted that the W a-
satch Springs Plunge was operated in a pro-
prietary capacity, ·as it could have done, if such 
were not the facts, by filing an opposing affi-
davit as provided in Rule 59 (c) U.R.C.P." 
There is nothing in the record to justify this cqn-
clusion, until after the case was reopened. The appel-
lant's attorney took the attitude that the whole proceed-
ing on the part of the respondent was, after rendition 
of the verdict, illegal and did not comport with the rules 
of civil procedure. Why did not the respondent amend 
11 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
his complaint at the pre-trial if the capacity in which 
the city was acting was discussed? Yet one of the 
grounds for reopening the trial was that he was sur-
p.rised. 
Rule 59 (a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
pertinent parts here, provide as follows: 
" (a) Grounds. Subject to the 'provisions of 
Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all or 
any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, 
for any of the following causes; provided, how-
ever, that on a motion for a new trial in an 
action tried without a jury_, the court may open 
the judgment if one has been entered, take addi-
tional testimony, amend findings of fact and 
conclusions of law or make new findings and con-
clusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment: 
"***" . 
Rule 59 (a) was not designed to reopen a case tried 
by a jury after its verdict has been rendered and judg-
ment thereon entered, but under its provisions, it is 
respectfully submitted that such may be done only 
where the case is tried to the court without a jury and 
one or more of the grounds set forth in the rule alleged. 
The plaintiff below requested and was granted a 
jury trial without specifying any particular issues to 
be tried. Rule 38 (c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure provides as follows: 
" (c) Same: Specification of Issues. In his 
demand a party may specify the issues which he 
wishes so tried; otherwise he shall be deemed to 
12 
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have demanded trial by jury for all the issues so 
triable. If he has demanded trial by jury for 
only some of the issues, the other party within 
10 days after service of the demand or such lesser 
time as the court may order, may serve a demand 
for trial by jury of any other or all of the issues 
of fact in the action." 
Rule 39 (a) provides as follows: 
''When trial by jury has been demanded as 
provided in Rule 38, the action shall be desig-
nated upon the register of actions as a jury 
action. The trial of all issues so demanded shall 
be by jury~ unless (I) the parties of their attor-
neys of record, by written stipulation filed with 
the court or. by an oral stipulation made in open 
court and entered in the record, consent to trial 
by the court sitting without a jury, or (2) the 
court ·upon motion or of its own initiative finds 
· that a right of trial by jury of some or all of 
those issues does not exist, or (3} either. party 
to t:l~e is~ue fails to appear at the trial." 
: In 'the case ·of Houston Real Estate Investment 
Co. v. Hechler~ 47 Utah 215, 152 P. 726, in which one 
of t~e parties tried to convert a trial at law to one in 
~quity after rendition of a jury verdict, claiming su.ch 
verdict was advisory only and to the proposition t~is 
court held: 
"The case having, up to rendition of the verdict, 
been treated by the parties and the court as one 
trial by the jury, one of the parties having merely 
suggested to the judge in chambers, during an 
intermission, that he thought the case equitable 
and the verdict advisory merely, the court was 
13 
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required to render judgment on the verdict, 
and, could not make findings at variance with 
the verdict, and thereon render judgment." 
Neither could the lower court after the rendition 
of the verdict convert a jury trial into one by the court 
alone and make new findings upon facts not heard by 
the jury. Such a procedure barred cross-examination by 
the appellant and request .for special interrogatories 
to be put to the jury if such were found necessary. 
POINT III 
THE PREVAILING OPINION AND THE 
DECISION OF THE COURT IS IN ERROR 
IN HOLDING THAT TWO PREVIOUS 
CASES INVOLVING THE WASATCH 
SPRINGS PLUNGE RESOLVES THE PRO-
PRIETARY FUNCTION OF THE DEFEND-
ANT CITY IN THE CASE AT BAR WHEN 
NOT PLEADED BY THE PLAINTIFF. 
The plaintiff Rumsey never pleaded any sufficient 
facts showing that the city operated the Wasatch 
Springs Plunge in a proprietary capacity while the 
jury for whom he asked to hear the case, was in session 
or before the jury trial came on for hearing. The appel-
lant agrees with the dissenting opinion in this regard 
and herein repeats that dissenting language: 
"It is no answer to assert that in two previous 
swimming pool cases we have affirmed the City's 
14 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
role as proprietor, since each case must stand or 
fall on its own facts, and no end of stare decisis 
can establish that a city can't operate a swim-
ming. pool other than in a proprietary capacity. 
"Nor is it an answer to say that the issue of 
immunity conclusively was resolved against the 
City by a pre-trial stipulation that Rumsey was 
a 'business invitee,'-implying that such conclu-
sion of necessity put the City in competition with 
privately operated pools. Two good reasons 
refute such conclusion: 
"I) A person, for example, may be a business 
invitee when he goes to the city treasurer to pay 
the tax on the bu_siness he operates, but such a 
circumstance could not ipso facto make the city 
a businessman under any of. the rules incident 
to a ga~e of musica~ chairs. The whole thing 
is a matter ,of fact,-that's all,-and Rumsey 
failed to allege or prove the conditionally prece-
dential :required to construct his claim of tortious 
compensability. 
"2) Assuming arguendo, that the officials of 
the city attempted to stipulate away the latter's 
immunity, it couldn't be done, since a govern-
ment official cannot sell the city's immunity down 
the river with impunity. 
"As to the second trial, the main opinion says 
it was surplusage because the governmental im-
munity was resolved by stipulation at pretrial. 
The latter fallacious conclusion followed the 
equally fallacious assumption of the former. 
Counsel for plaintiff himself did not entertain 
any such gratuitous or novel assumption, since, 
by the very motion for another trial, he conceded 
that Rumsey had failed to plead or prove a pro-
prietary role by the City." 
15 .. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated and the errors of the main 
opinion now called to the court's attention, it is respect-
fully submitted that the court should grant the appel-
lant's petition for rehearing and the judgment of the 
lower court reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HOMER HOLMGREN 
City Attorney for Salt Lake City 
A. M. MARSDEN 
Assistant City Attorney 
ATTORNEYS FOR THE 
APPELLANT 
414 City & County Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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